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i n t r o d u c t i o n : This study is a replication of Murphy and Zajonc (1993), Jenner (2000), 
and Chalmers (2000) in order to test the affective priming hypothesis. 
m e t h o d : University of Edinburgh students were shown short exposures of faces 
showing emotional expressions (affective primes) ranging from 12.5 ms to 44 ms. 
This was followed by a mask and then a neutral face which they were asked to rate for 
likeability on a scale from 1 to 5. Their recognition of the emotional face was tested by 
a separate experiment at each exposure time.
r e s u l t s : No affective priming effect was found either when there was no recognition 
of the affective prime above chance or when recognition was significantly above chance. 
However, the results do suggest that recognition of the polarity of emotion shown 
occurs before the recognition of the specific emotion.
c o n c lu s i o n : This study does not support Murphy and Zajonc’s (1993) affective priming 
hypothesis. The findings do suggest that the primary recognition of faces may be towards 
a positive/negative judgement with the identification of the specific emotion shown 
occurring later.
Du n c a n : There’s no art
to find the mind’s construction in the face.
Macbeth I iv
As King Duncan found out, the facial expression 
of an emotion is not so simple to interpret as it 
might seem. Even though ‘emotion’ is such a 
central concept to the human condition, it eludes 
precise definition.
What is an emotion?
William James (1884) answered this question by 
posing another: “Do we run from a bear because 
we are afraid or are we afraid because we run?” 
The first answer seems intuitively correct, but 
James’ “thesis on the contrary [was] that the 
bodily changes follow directly on the perception 
of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the 
same changes as they occur is the emotion” 
(James, 1884), i.e. we are afraid because we run 
away.
Furthermore James proposed that emotions 
were differentiated from each other by the physi­
ological changes that ‘caused’ them. James’ 
theory of emotion held a dominant position, un­
til Cannon’s (1927) claim that bodily changes in 
various emotions were not distinctive enough for
James to be correct. However he did agree that it 
was the physiological changes that differentiated 
emotions from other states.
Following a dearth of research, the 1960s 
marked a period of change in the psychological 
attitude to emotions. Schachter and Singer (1962) 
synthesised James’ and Cannon’s theories and 
added a cognitive component. They suggested 
that the previously mentioned physiological 
changes result in a state of non-specific increased 
autonomic arousal. We then interpret this height­
ened arousal in the light of our situation i.e. 
social context, knowledge, and expectation. In 
effect they claim the emotional experience is a 
label given to a general physiological state which 
depends on a cognitive interpretation of the con­
text the person finds themself in.
Schachter and Singer provided empirical evi­
dence for their theory by injecting people with 
epinephrine and providing either pleasant, un­
pleasant or emotionally neutral situations, thus 
varying the mood reported by the participants.
Lazarus (1982, 1984) developed this school of
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thought and provided evidence that emotions 
are dependent on the unconscious appraisal (i.e. 
interpretation) given to them. He goes so far as 
to say that “appraisal is a necessary as well as 
sufficient cause of emotion” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 
352). In order to support his point he showed a 
film of a gruesome circumcision ritual with a 
narrative which either played up or played down 
the disturbing content of the film. The commen­
tary significantly affected the subjects’ autonomic 
responses and self-reports afterwards, leading 
him to his conclusion about the importance of 
appraisal.
Fundamental feelings or cognition the King? 
A ppraisal is still a m ajor com ponent 
contemporary psychological theory of emotion. 
However Zajonc (1980) has tried to turn the tide 
of cognitive psychology’s influence in emotion 
by proposing that emotion and cognition are 
independent.
He first put forward this idea in 1980 by 
publishing a “rather speculative article” (Zajonc, 
1984, p. 117) entitled “Feeling and Thinking: 
Preferences Need No Inferences”. In essence his 
main question was w hether we can “like 
something or be afraid of it before we know 
precisely what it is” (Zajonc, 1980, p. 154).
The paper referred to a large amount of 
empirical evidence involving the mere exposure 
effect— the phenomenon that repeated exposure 
to a stimulus “enhances [one’s] attitude toward 
it” (Zajonc, 1968, p. 1), i.e. mere exposure to 
som ething can create a preference for it. 
Importantly however, this effect is still observed 
if the stimuli are presented subliminally, i.e. 
unconsciously (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). 
The participants will still prefer the stimuli they 
have already seen to new ones but will not be 
able to consciously differentiate between the new 
and old stimuli. More recently Murphy and 
Zajonc (1993) have investigated the phenomenon 
of affective prim ing, where “positive and 
negative affective reactions can be evoked with 
minimal stimulus input and virtually no cognitive 
processing” (p. 723). They found that sub- 
optimal exposure to an affective prime (facial 
expressions) could bias subjects’ judgement of a 
neutral stimulus (Chinese ideograms) presented 
afterwards. The subjects were unable to recognise
which face they had seen when presented with 
the face and a foil.
That preferences can be formed without any 
conscious recognition of the stimulus leads 
Zajonc to the conclusion that the emotional 
judgements (preferences) were formed without 
the involvement of cognition- in effect that affect 
and cognition are separate and partially  
independent systems, citing neuroanatomical 
separation of affect and cognition in support of 
his theory.
The debate in the psychological literature 
between Lazarus and Zajonc is quite involved 
and slightly confusing. They both base their 
theories on different definitions of emotion and 
they both adm it that neither position is 
disprovable: “ ...the question contested here 
cannot be fully resolved unless we have a full 
understanding of consciousness” (Zajonc, 1984, 
p. 118); “ ...at this stage of theory, knowledge 
and methods, Zajonc can no more prove that 
cognition is not present in any emotion, much 
less before it occurs, than I can prove it is present” 
(Lazarus, 1984, p. 126).
Surely a feasible hypothesis would be that 
affect is primary, i.e. preferences can be formed 
without the involvement of cognition, but they 
seldom are. This fits in with Zajonc’s explanation 
and also with Lazarus’ dual neural pathways (sub- 
cortical and indirect, via the cortex). If cognition 
(which would react after affect) contradicted the 
emotional reaction, the cognitive reaction would 
predom inate, as L azarus’ gruesom e film 
experiment suggests. In other words, they could 
both be correct.
How do our faces relate to our emotions? 
There is not room here to discuss theories of why 
we express our emotions in our faces. However, 
cross-cultural data suggest that there is universal 
expression of a number of so-called basic 
emotions (e.g. Ekman and Friesen, 1971; Ekman, 
et al. 1987; Ekman, 1992a, 1992b). These basic 
emotions including at least happiness, anger, fear, 
surprise, sadness, and disgust (Ekman, 1984), 
though there is some discussion about exactly 
how many and which emotions should be 
included. Ekman (1992) uses ‘basic’ in terms of 
having a biological basis, as well as combining 
to form more complex emotions. He cites
evidence of “different patterns of autonomic 
activity for the emotions of anger, fear, sadness 
and disgust” (p. 552), echoing James’ original 
theory from 1884. He suggests that happiness 
or contempt wouldn’t have distinct patterns of 
ANS activation because “it is unlikely that any 
specific pattern of motor activity [for such 
emotions] would have been relevant to survival. 
... [However,] I do expect to find distinctive 
patterns of central nervous system activity 
marking each of the basic emotions” (p. 552).
A currently popular theory of the relation 
between emotions and facial expression is the 
facial feedback hypothesis— that “expressive 
behaviour plays a role in activating and regulating 
emotion experience” (Izard, 1990, p. 488). This 
idea dates back to Darwin (1872) (“even the 
simulation of an emotion tends to arouse it in 
our minds”).
Where is emotion found in the brain?
An attempt has been made to describe the nature 
of emotions and their relation to cognition and 
an explanation of facial expressions of emotion 
has been touched on. Unfortunately there is not 
room for a thorough discussion of the 
neuroanatom ical and neurophysiological 
findings regarding emotion. Therefore the 
discussion will be confined to two areas: the 
Papez circuit and recognition of disgust.
The most famous neural theory of emotion must 
be the Papez circuit (Papez, 1937). This derives 
from Broca’s (1878) structural definition of ‘le 
grand lobe limbique’ (limbus = rim (latin)) and 
a distinction between the more primitive medial 
cortex and the lateral (neo-)cortex involved in 
thought processes and sensory/motor functions. 
The Papez circuit explains “the subjective 
experience of emotion in terms of the flow of 
em otion through a circle of anatom ical 
connections from the hypothalamus to the medial 
cortex and back to the hypothalamus” (LeDoux, 
1998, p. 87). Papez thought of the sensory inputs 
to the thalamus being split into a stream of 
thought and a stream of feeling.
The former was directed to the neocortex to 
form perceptions, thoughts, and memories and 
the latter was directed to the hypothalamus to 
form emotions. The cingulate cortex was where
affective flavouring was thought to be given to 
everyday events.
MacLean (1949) took this model further and 
explained our frequent inability to adequately 
describe our emotions with the idea that the 
emotional ‘visceral brain’ and the ‘word brain’ 
used different languages. In 1952 he renamed 
the visceral brain the limbic system (harking 
back to Broca, 1878) to avoid confusion with 
the physiological concept of ‘viscera’.
People with Huntington’s disease or even 
merely the gene for it show impairments of 
emotion recognition with severe specific 
im pairm ent of recognition of disgust 
(Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Gray et al., 1997). 
This differential impairment of different basic 
emotions (a similar situation occurs for fear with 
damage to the amygdala) gives weight to the 
theory that there are separate neural systems fbr 
the recognition of certain emotions.
Pathologically H untington’s disease is 
characterised by atrophy of the caudate nucleus 
and putamen (collectively, the striatum) and, to 
a lesser extent, the globus pallidus. There is also 
dilation of the lateral and third ventricles and 
frontal lobe atrophy (Cotran et al., 1999). This 
pathological data, along with the specific 
impaired recognition of disgust in those with 
Huntington’s disease, implicates the basal ganglia 
and specifically the striatum in the recognition 
of disgust. Similarly impaired recognition of 
disgust is seen in obsessive compulsive disorder 
and Gilles de la Tourette’s syndrome with co- 
morbid obsessive-com pulsive behaviour 
(Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997) adds weight to the 
involvement of the fronto-striatal region in the 
mediation of disgust. Furthermore, fMRI studies 
have added even more support to the involvement 
of the striatum and the anterior insula in the 
recognition of disgust (Phillips et al., 1997; 
Phillips et al., 1998).
Method.
Participants
Twelve undergraduate students (8 female and 4 
male in 12.5ms conditon or 7 female and 5 male 
in 25ms and 44ms conditions), mean age = 23.2 
(12.5ms); 20.9 (25ms); 20.9 (44ms).
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Materials and apparatus 
Faces were from Ekman and Friesen’s (1976) 
selection (Happy: PE, JB, JM, SW; Angry: EM. 
WF, NR, SW; Disgusted: JB, WF, JM, MO). 
Masking ideogram was constructed to provide 
optimal masking of the mouth and eyes of the 
primes. (Editor’s note. To reproduce these would 
have infringed copyright. Instead, we took our 
own pictures. See figure 1).
Procedure
The participant was shown the twelve neutral 
faces in a random order preceded by a 12.5ms, 
25ms, or 44ms exposure to an affective prime 
and a 30 ms ideogram mask. After each face 
the participant was asked to give a rating for 
how much they liked the face from 1 ( ‘not at 
all')  to 5 ( ‘quite a bit’). They were asked to 
respond within the first few seconds of seeing 
the face. This was carried out on three separate 
occasions so that each face could be rated after 
priming with each emotion but the effect of 
the memory of seeing the same face earlier in 
the experiment would be minimised.
In each trial four of the faces followed happy 
primes, four followed angry primes and four 
followed disgusted primes. Each participant 
saw one of six arrangements of  primes in 
relation to neutral faces (e.g. faces A to D 
primed with happy on one day, then angry, 
then disgusted or faces A to D primed with 
angry on one day, then happy, then disgusted 
etc.)
After each session the participant was shown 
exposures  o f  the tw elve prim es (for an 
appropriate duration), each followed by the 
mask, and after each one asked to identify 
the em o tio n  (ou t o f  happy, angry , or 
disgusted). This was to test recognition of the 
emotions of the primes.
Results.
Figure 2 shows mean correct identification 
of specific emotions and emotion polarity 
(i.e. re cogn is ing  angry  or d isgusted  as 
‘negative’; happy was the only ‘positive’ 
em otion).  At 12.5 ms exposure  neither 
emotion nor polarity could be identified 
above chance. At 25 ms exposure happy and 
angry, but not disgust, and positive and
negative polarity were recognised above chance. 
At 44 ms only happy and negative polarity for 
angry were recognised above chance.
Figure 3 shows the mean ‘likeablilty’ rating of 
a neutral face following affective primes at 12.5 
ms ex p o su re .  As can be seen there  is no 
significant difference between rating of the faces. 
In other words, no affective priming effect was 
seen.
F igu re  4 show s the m ean  n u m b e r  o f  
misidentifications of angry or disgusted (the 
negative emotions). At 12.5 ms there is no 
difference in misidentification to positive or 
negative, at 25 ms there is a significantly higher 
nu m b er  o f  m is id e n ti f ic a t io n s  to the o ther  
negative emotion for angry and disgusted. This 
remains at 44 ms for disgust, but not angry.
Figure 5 shows misidentification of happy 
primes. Again, at 12.5 ms, there is no difference 
in positive or negative misidentifications. At 25 
and 44 ms th ere  is a s ig n i f ic a n t ly  low er 
misidentification to negative emotions.
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Figure 2 Mean correct recognition (± 2  SD) o f  individual emotions (a) and emotions categorised by 
polarity (b) at exposure times o f  12.5, 25 and 44 ms. H  =  identification significantly above chance 
(H p  < .05, H H p <  .01, H H H  p< .001). I =  significant difference in identification between exposure 
times (1 p< .05).
Discussion.
This study has found no evidence of  affective 
priming with or without recognition of  facial 
primes. Subliminal presentation o f  an affective 
stimulus before a neutral face failed to bias a 
judgem ent o f  likeability o f  the face.
Jenner (2000) and Chalmers (2000) found that 
hap p y  w as c o r re c t ly  id en t i f ied  by 29 ms 
exposure  and anger  and d isgust were only 
correctly identified at 53 ms exposure. In the 
present study the results were not dissimilar: 
hap p y  w as  c o r re c t ly  id en t i f ied  by 25 ms 
ex p o su re  and ang ry  and d isg u s t  w ere  not 
correctly identified above chance at 44 ms (the 
longest exposure time used), except for angry
Happy Angry Disgusted
Figure 3. Mean rating o f  neutral face  follow ing  
affective primes (+ 2  SD). Rating was on a scale 
o f  1 (don't like face at all) to 5 (like the face  quite 
a bit).
at 25 ms exposure (this identification was not 
evident at 44 ms). However the polarity o f  both 
angry and disgust were identified significantly 
ab o v e  ch a n c e  at 25 ms e x p o su re  and  the 
polarity  o f  d isgust was correctly  identified 
significantly above chance at 44 ms. Figure 2 
summarises these findings.
It was noticed that angry primes were often 
mistaken for happy, possibly because of  the bared 
teeth o f  half o f  the angry primes being mistaken 
for a smile. It is possible that the negative polarity 
in angry primes w asn 't  correctly identified at 44 
m s b e c a u se  o f  th is .  Too lit t le  d a ta  in th is  
ex per im en t (12 subjects  each iden tify ing  12 
primes) could possibly also play a part.
Furthermore, as the exposure time increases the 
n u m b er  o f  errors  w hich  a ttr ibu te  the w rong  
polarity to disgusted primes decrease, leaving 
most o f  the errors to be errors o f  specific emotion 
but with the correct polarity being identified. At 
12.5 ms exposure time there is no significant 
difference in the number of  errors identifying the 
prime as the wrong polarity or the correct polarity 
for either angry or disgusted primes. By 25 ms 
exposure, the num ber of  errors misidentifying 
the polarity of  the emotion has decreased leaving 
a s ig n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e e n  
m isidentifications o f  the correc t polarity  and 
those o f  the wrong polarity. This continues at 44 
ms exposure for disgusted primes but not for 
angry primes. Overall for angry primes there is 
no significant relationship between type of  errors
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and exposure time. These results are shown in 
Figure 4.
These findings, along with those for happy 
primes (Figure 5), suggest that the primary 
recognition of faces could be a positive/negative 
evaluation with recognition of the specific 
expression (happy, angry, or disgusted) coming 
in. at a longer exposure. The lack of such an effect 
for angry primes could be partly because of 
misrecognition of bared teeth as smiles, as 
mentioned above.
There are obviously weaknesses to this study, 
not least the number of subjects and the paucity 
of neutral faces available to rate (there are only 
14 in the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series).
It would have been useful to analyse the rating 
of individual neutral faces when primed 
positively and negatively. Another positive 
emotion (e.g. surprise) would allow more useful 
comparisons of recognition of polarity.
In conclusion, this study does not support 
Murphy and Zajonc’s (1993) findings and 
suggests that conscious exposure to affective 
primes, at least up to 44 ms, does not affect 
judgements of preference either. However it does 
suggest that recognition of polarity of emotion 
of a facial expression may occur before 
recognition of the specific emotion shown by the 
prime.
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Happy (pos.) Happy (neg.)
Figure 5. Mean number (± 2 SD) o f 
misidentifications o f happy primes. The polarity 
o f the misattributed emotion is given in 
brackets. H = significant difference in identifi­
cation between emotions(HHH p < .001). 
I = significant difference in identification be­
tween exposure times (III p < .001).
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